Kyle Wesson (The University of Texas at Austin), “Secure Navigation and Timing without Storage of Local Keys” (2014)

Kyle Wesson (The University of Texas at Austin), “Secure Navigation and Timing without Storage of Local Keys”, Prof. Brian Evans and Prof. Todd Humphreys, (2014)

Civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) broadcast unencrypted signals worldwide according to an open-access standard. The transparency and predictability of these signals render them easy to counterfeit, or spoof. Counterfeit GNSS signals can deceive a receiver into reporting spoofer-controlled position or time. Given integration of civil GNSS into critical national infrastructure and safety-of-life applications, a successful spoofing attack could have significant consequences. As a defense against spoofing attacks, military GNSS employs symmetric-key encryption, which is impractical for civil GNSS. In this dissertation, the author proposed a new navigation and timing security approach that avoids operating with a locally stored secret key while maintaining a high resistance to spoofing. The contributions are: (1) probabilistic framework for signal authentication, (2) asymmetric-key cryptographic signal authentication technique, and (3) noncryptographic spoofing detection technique. These techniques are viable spoofing defenses for civil users.

For details, please contact the author or visit the thesis page.